![]() ![]() ![]() For from what impression cou’d this idea be deriv’d? This question ’tis impossible to answer without a manifest contradiction and absurdity and yet ’tis a question, which must necessarily be answer’d, if we wou’d have the idea of self pass for clear and intelligible. Unluckily all these positive assertions are contrary to that very experience, which is pleaded for them, nor have we any idea of self, after the manner it is here explain’d. To attempt a farther proof of this were to weaken its evidence since no proof can be deriv’d from any fact, of which we are so intimately conscious nor is there any thing, of which we can be certain, if we doubt of this.Ģ. The strongest sensation, the most violent passion, say they, instead of distracting us from this view, only fix it the more intensely, and make us consider their influence on self either by their pain or pleasure. There are some philosophers, who imagine we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our SELF that we feel its existence and its continuance in existence and are certain, beyond the evidence of a demonstration, both of its perfect identity and simplicity. From A Treatise of Human Nature, Book I: Of the understanding, Part IV: Of the sceptical and other systems of philosophy Section VI: Of Personal Identity by David Hume.ġ. ![]()
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